Challenges of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh

Law And Order Criminal Intent Cast History - Challenges of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh

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1. Ideas and practices of local government:

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Law And Order Criminal Intent Cast History

Most population think social representatives as local guardians who work with them, and with whom they can share all sorts of personal, social, religious and political thoughts and beliefs. With the increase in power and volume of activities of the government, the accountability and duty of the local government has also been increased by several times. Colse to the world most challenges population face are local. So, the best way to solve them is through local initiatives and local leadership by awakening and mobilizing people. Authorities closest to the population or rather citizens themselves by getting directly complicated can greatly conduce in solving social problems. This is how the local government takes its shape. Local government brings decision-making closer to the people. A strong local government law can ensure good governance through transparency, accountability, effective participation and equal opportunities for all. Most importantly, this law can ensure development at the grassroots level. Strong local government institutions expand democracy, ensure good governance, and at the same time quicken the pace of political and socioeconomic development of the country.

1.1. New view of local government:

Local government is based on society governance, and focused on citizen-centered local governance. It is the customary agent for the citizens and leader and gatekeeper for shared rule, is responsive and accountable to local voters. It is purchaser of local services, and facilitator of network mechanisms of local governance, coordinator of government providers and entities beyond government, mediator of conflicts, and developer of social capital. It is externally focused and competitive; ardent practitioner of alternative service delivery framework; open, quick, and flexible, innovative. It is risk taker within limits, autonomous in taxing, spending, regulatory, and menagerial decisions. It has managerial flexibility and accountability for results. It is participatory; and works to expand population voice and exit options through direct democracy provisions, citizens' charters, and operation budgeting. It is focused on earning trust, creating space for civic dialogue, serving the citizens, and improving social outcomes. It is fiscally prudent; works great and costs less, inclusive and participatory. It overcomes market and government failures. Local government is associated in a globalized and localized world

1.2. Citizen-centered local governance:

Reforming the institutions of local governance requires bargain on basic principles. Three basic law are industrialized to open such a discussion:

* Responsive governance: This principle aims for governments to do the right things-that is, to deliver services consistent with population preferences.
* Responsible governance: The government should also do it right-that is, manage its fiscal resources prudently. It should earn the trust of residents by working great and costing less and by managing fiscal and social risks for the community. It should strive to heighten the ability and quantity of and passage to social services. To do so, it needs to benchmark its operation with the best-performing local government.
* Accountable governance: A local government should be accountable to its electorate. It should adhere to acceptable safeguards to ensure that it serves the social interest with integrity. Legal and institutional reforms may be needed to enable local governments to deal with accountability between elections-reforms such as a citizen's charter and a provision for recall of social officials.

The distinguishing features of citizen-centered governance are the following:

* population empowerment through a rights-based approach (direct democracy provisions, citizens' charter);
* Bottom-up accountability for results;
* evaluation of government operation as the facilitator of a network of providers by citizens as governors, taxpayers, and consumers of social services.

1.3. Local government as an custom to expand self-interest: The social option approach:

The approach has conceptualized four models of local government:

* A local government that assumes it knows best and acts to maximize the welfare of its residents conforms to the benevolent despot model.
* A local government that provides services consistent with local residents' willingness to pay conforms to the fiscal replacement model.
* A local government that focuses on social service provision to expand social objectives conforms to the fiscal replacement model.
* A local government that is captured by self-interested bureaucrats and politicians conforms to the leviathan model, which is consistent with the social option perspectives.

1.4. Local government as an independent facilitator of creating social value: new social supervision (Npm) perspectives:

Two interrelated criteria have emerged from the Npm literature in new years determining, first, what local governments should do and, second, how they should do it better. In discussing the first criterion, the literature assumes that citizens are the principals but have many roles as governors (owner-authorizers, voters, taxpayers, society members); activist-producers (providers of services, co-producers, self-helpers obliging others to act); and consumers (clients and beneficiaries). In this context, requisite emphasis is settled on the government as an agent of the population to serve social interest and generate social value. This opinion is directly relevant to local and municipal services, for which it is feasible to measure such improvements and have some sense of attribution. The opinion is useful in evaluating conflicting and perplexing choices in the use of local resources. The opinion is also helpful in defining the role of government, especially local governments. It frames the debate between those who argue that the social sector crowds out inexpressive sector investments and those who argue that the social sector creates an enabling environment for the inexpressive sector to succeed, in increasing to providing basic municipal and social services.

2. History of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh:

Bangladesh shares its history with the undivided Indian subcontinent. The British in India in fact gave local government a legal shape with municipal supervision law for the first time in 1793. But, prior to that, an identical law of local village society did exist in India, where Gram Panchayet (local government village tier) had a requisite role. In the gradual development of the system, the Bengal Act 1842 and Municipal Act 1850 were introduced. The local government law got a stronger foundation when 118 Municipal Boards were formed in Bengal in 1947 after inclusion of provisions relating to a newer law of social arbitrations, conservancy activities and appointment of choukidars (guards) for maintaining security in villages and towns. In 1972, the local government law got a newer magnitude in independent Bangladesh.

After independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Constitution of Bangladesh emphasizes the need for establishing local government with a representative character (Chapter 3, narrative 59). narrative 59 mandates the creation of elected local bodies at each menagerial unit- District, Upazila (sub-district) and Union (currently lowest tier of local government). To put it simply, these bodies are for the supervision of local affairs by locally elected persons. Local government, by definition, is democratic self-governance and so accountable to the people.

There are two types of local government settings in Bangladesh, rural and urban. At the rural level the existing law provides a three-tier structure, which is Zila (district) Parishad (office), Upazila Parishad, and Union Parishad (Up). At the urban level the six largest cities have City Corporation status, while the rest are known as Pourashavas or Municipalities. These bodies are entrusted with a large whole of functions and responsibilities relating to civic and society welfare as well as local development.

The Up is responsible for executing 48 duties. Among them 38 are elective and 10 mandatory. These responsibilities are divided into four categories. These are civic duties (building roads, bridges etc), tax collection, maintaining law and order, and lastly development work. In spite of the significance and possible of local government institutions, they remain weak in Bangladesh. The past few years show they have become even weaker.

3. Challenges of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh:

3.1. Attitude of social administrators toward local governments:

Bureaucracies resist changes out of the fear of alteration or disturbance of the status quo and their resistance primarily grows out of fear of disrupting organizational communication. Agreeing to Henry Frank Goodnow says, bureaucracy is a two-edged sword, which can be a force for good or for evil. It may prompt democracy or totalitarianism. It may be feared or respected or merely accepted. Joseph La Palomba comments, the nearnessy of a strong bureaucracy in many of the new states tends to inhibit the increase of strong executives, political parties, legislatures, voluntary associations and other political institutions requisite to viable democratic government.

Warren Bennis summarizes some of the deficiencies in bureaucracies, which adequately suit the characteristics of bureaucracies in Bangladesh as well:

* Bureaucracy does not adequately allow for personal increase and the development of mature personalities.
* It does not take into list the "informal organization" and the emergent unanticipated problems.
* Its systems of operate and authority are hopelessly outdated.
* It has no judicial process.
* It does not possess adequate means for resolving discrepancy and conflicts between ranks, and most particularly, between functional groups.
* communication (and innovative ideas) are thwarted or distorted due to hierarchical decisions.
* The full human resources of bureaucracy are not being utilized due to mistrust, fear or reprisals, etc.
* It cannot assimilate the influx of new technology or scientists entering the organization.

3.2. Participation by the people:

The Constitution of Bangladesh implies direct participation of the population in forming the local bodies and in managing the affairs of such bodies. There are separate levels of participation, participation in decision-making, participation in implementation, participation in benefits, and participation in evaluation.

But in reality, the spirit of people's participation in local bodies has not all the time been adequately maintained. The society of Bangladesh is basically a hierarchic law based on a person's social position, caste, status, educational background, seniority, and gender. The principle of hierarchy in interpersonal relationship, is, and for hundreds of years has been acceptable as requisite and morally right in rural Bangladesh, even among the Muslims. In a hierarchic system, roles and duties in relation to others are defined in details. If these are not followed, chaos and friction are anticipated to result.

A patron-client association binds group members with specific norms and values. These norms resolve role definition and role expectation, i.e., the role of a patron and a client. The opinion of obedience and deference to patrons by a client is an foremost value in a hierarchic society like Bangladesh. Patterns of rights and duties declare both order and equilibrium in our society. Superiors in the society are supposed to give orders and advice to those with a lower status. population having low ranks are treated as children and they enjoy miniature opportunities. The patron-client or parent-child association industrialized over centuries has taught the superiors to be harsh and commanding towards the subordinates, and has taught the subordinates to be respectful to afraid of the superiors of the society. Due to power length in the society, the subordinates seek direction and advice from the superiors. Subordinates or those with lower rank in the society feel dejected when they don't receive favor from the superiors. In practice, the population being loyal to the superiors are bestowed with favors (even undue), and those who do not are distanced and discriminated.

This dynamics of social trust and behavior inhibits the common mass in participating in decision production process of the local government institutions, or keeping them accountable for their activities.

3.3. Structural defects:

Decentralization of political and menagerial authority at the local government level that has the possible to de-concentrate decision-making and bring population closer to social governance have the merit of weakening abuse of power, strengthening accountability and combating corruption convincingly. This is revealed through a new Un inspect that demonstrates that introduction of elucidate audit systems, corruption commissions etc. Without due regard to the rule of law, independence of judiciary, civil liberties, economic and political decentralization make miniature or no impact on corruption. Corruption resells in loss of trust in local government among the people. Funds for projects like Food for Work or disaster relief are all too often misused by local leaders; even Vgf (Vulnerable Group Feeding) cards go to their relatives and friends rather than those who surely need it.

The extent and ability of people's participation have been variable. The most direct participation is the occasion of casting votes during the choice to local bodies. But elections are not held at regular intervals. Since Independence in 1971, successive governments have tried to use the local government law for their own political interests. The party or regime in power wanted to make the local government representatives their power base and manipulated the law to this end.

Regarding the structural or constitutional defects in local government, it can be said that the country is being governed through a constitutional, democratic system, while local government is being run through a presidential system. In local government all the powers centre Colse to one person. This unchallenged power of an private is giving rise to corruption and autocracy in local government bodies, where a chairman of a Up or municipality, or the mayor of a city corporation, enjoys all the power. Members of a Up and the ward commissioners of municipalities or city corporations hardly have any role in the implementation of any development task or agenda in the locality.

They fear local administrations might be rendered ineffective and law makers might end up lording over Upazila Parishads, running the risk of letting corruption creep into the system, if Mps (Members of Parliament) are allowed to have their old controlling authority over the elected local governments.

Recently National institute of Local Government (Nilg) and Volunteer service Overseas (Vso) Bangladesh jointly conducted a study titled "Exploring the challenges and potentials of Up standing committees", which was intended to inspect the role of standing committees in the decision production process at the Ups. The study narrative published on 6 May 2009 says that 60% of the committees are not functioning, and it identifies some major reasons for non-functioning of the standing committees, such as, apathy of Up chairmen, ignorance of members and lack of resources and proper monitoring system. The narrative says the Up chairmen dominate while taking decisions and do not think that the committees are very foremost in this regard.

3.4. Lack of fund and affect in fund utilization:

Up receives a major measure of the funds from the yearly development Programme (Adp). This funding law is full of loopholes creating serious setbacks in development activities. Funding by Adp is paid in installments, which are called block grants. This block grant does not flow to the Up directly; rather it is channeled through the Upazila. At the Upazila level interference from the supervision ordinarily slows down the flow and hampers the development plan. The criteria for funds comprise on population, size of an area and the level of backwardness. As the supervision controls the distribution process, it tends to be biased.

The funds is also prone to political interference. The interference by Mps in the Up affairs, particularly in development activities, has weakened the Ups' independence. The Mps often dictate the development activities to be undertaken, most of the times without consulting with the local elected representatives or assessing actual needs. Ruling party Mps tend to intrude more in the Ups' development planning. Even if there is no ruling party Mp in the area the local leaders of the ruling party meddle in the process.

Moreover, the Up authorities ordinarily have no idea how much money they are about to receive, which makes planning for future development work impractical. The development projects get stalled if the installments do not arrive on time, which is often the case. Most Ups receive the installments when the fiscal year is about to end.

Adp funds to Up is less than 2 per cent of the yearly budget. For development activities, this whole is carefully inadequate. The maximum whole in implementing a development task is only Tk 50,000 which is also insufficient. Furthermore, this fund is not released unless bribes are paid, as local Up members claimed.

3.5. Political government's willful stance on local government institutions:

The new Upazila Pashishad Act passed by the current Awami League government provides that the Members of Parliament would be advisers to the Upazila Parishads. Agreeing to the law, no development plans can be taken or no programs can be implemented by the Upazila Parishads without the advice of the concerned Mps, and even any communication between Upazilas and the government must be informed to the Mps. This act explicitly contradicts the opinion of modern government with its three branches - legislative, menagerial and judiciary - being mutually interdependent. While the voice gets stronger for disunion of powers among its branches in order to ensure checks and balances, the government rather tends to merge the branches into one. In principle, the legislators are supposed to enact laws, make budgetary allocations, debate policy issues, approve foreign treaties, and most importantly practice parliamentary oversight over the menagerial actions through standing committees. This act is in contradiction with narrative 59 of the Constitution, which empowers the locally elected persons to run local affairs. In the name of advice, the Mps will obviously exert their authority to operate the affairs of the local bodies, which denounces the democratic spirit of representative local bodies.

A judgment in 2008 by Justices Abm Khairul Haque and Atm Fazle Kabir states that "The Local Government Bodies in every menagerial units of the Republic are charged with the functions relating to supervision and the work of social officers in the local area, the maintenance of local order and other nation-building development activities there. Neither the Ministers nor the members of Parliament can abdicate the functions of the elected members of the Local Government Bodies in respect of their functions in the concerned menagerial units." It additional says, "While the menagerial Government under chapter-Ii would run the administration, development and other ancillary matters for the entire country as a whole, but at the same time the population at the grass-root level should also be made responsible for the development of their own respective areas, on the formation of local government bodies, in order to bring the development and also supervision to their door steps so that they can be responsible as well as self-reliant and also become part of the over-all nation construction process."

In someone else judgment in 1992, the supreme Court holds that "Parliament is not free to legislate on local government ignoring Articles 59 and 60." It additional states about the functions of local government bodies... "local elections, policy for social accountability, independent and large sources of income, clear areas of independent action and certainty of powers and duties and the conditions under which they would be exercised."

As per the law, at least theoretically, the Upazila Parishads have lost their characteristics of local government bodies, since in the name of advice, the Mps are authorized to operate the activities of the bodies.

Squeezing the hope for effective local government:

As a matter of fact, what one has come to expect in Bangladesh is that after a party is overwhelmingly voted into power, they try and monopolize as much power as they can get, appoint loyal population to foremost posts and then seemingly do everything possible to tarnish their names. The current government has respected its own choice pledges to expand local government, and has abused its mandate as well. There was a hope that the current government would furnish additional authority to the Upazila chairmen by changing the old Upazila ordinances, but approximately the government has abolished the local government commission.

The current law has already given rise to a row among Upazila chairmen and Mps, and it is likely that this discord will affect the chain of the party leadership, which will additional destabilize the political arena of the country. The Parishads will face serious difficulties if the Mps are in case,granted with offices in Upazila Parishad complexes, and it might also disrupt local development. Interference of Mps with the functioning of the local government has been blatant, they said alleging that lawmakers want to get complicated in Upazila level development because an large whole of money is circulated through the local development circuit.

A group of newly elected representatives of Upazila Parishad in a view-exchange meeting at Jatiya (national) Press Club threatened to declare lawmakers persona-non-grata in Upazila Parishd complicated areas if the Upazila Parishad Act 2009 is not cancelled immediately. They also formed a forum titled "Bangladesh Upazila Chairmen Forum". Colse to 250 Up representatives attended the meeting that decided to hold a council of the forum within three months. The chairmen at the meeting also threatened to open a tough movement to comprehend their query for scrapping the Upazila Parishad Act 2009 and ensure the democratic rights of Up representatives. They feared that taking advantage of the act's provisions, lawmakers might misuse their power and indulge in corruption. This act will generate obstacles for local administrations to conducting development works freely, they added.

3.6. choice of honest and fine population in a free and fair environment:

It is an foremost task for us to elect honest and competent population in the next choice for the expand of the society. We have noticed how black money and muscle power have dominated in the elections in the last 15 years. What can we expect from those who are going to power through such a system? It is useless to expect whatever good from them. Use of money was ordinarily seen in the local government elections to buy votes to go to power. Culture of accumulation of wealthy and influential members, irrespective of their criminal records, and creation of inexpressive army by providing illegal facilities and security is predominantly existent in the society. That provides the look in a political buildings of wealth and corporeal force and carries more weight as regards its effectiveness in choice and other political operations in the gift day social context. Due to hierarchical social law and taboos, absence of equality, social justice and exact laws, and nearnessy of muscle power and black money, and due to political pressure from above, we see time and again approximately the same people, or population with same negative or not inevitable characters, being elected in local government institutions.

3.7. Intervention by central government:

Local government leadership and representation is now only equated with getting elected, with no meaningful mechanisms of representation or functionality. The local government bodies have virtually no power to plan and execute development actions or to formulate their budgets independently. The Up chair and members who are accountable to the voters soon comprehend the fact that they have approximately no power to serve the population and work for local development. Vital services like education, health, and social welfare are centralized at the Upazila level. The leaders have approximately no supervision role in these matters, rather the supervision at the Upazila level operate these services.

Here are few observations with regard to local government by foremost people:

* The local government cannot be strong adequate in a country where the local government ministry is too strong and intends to operate it. - Dr Mahabbat Khan, Professor of Dhaka University (Du)
* It seems that the local government institutions act like a front society of the ruling party. They should be independent and a local government commission, not any ministry, should operate them. - Prof Dr Salahuddin M. Alimuzzaman, Du
* Agreeing to the constitution, the government should encourage the local government institutions, not operate them. But some local government institutions are run by menagerial officials, which is a violation of the constitution. Although laws allow the local government institutions to comprehend keeping taxes, we cannot do it because of menagerial orders. - Advocate Azmatullah Khan, president of Municipality association of Bangladesh
* "The population of Bangladesh were very shocked when the government increased the operate of lawmakers over the local government against its pledge of strengthening the local government." - Shaheen Anam, menagerial director of Manusher Jonno
* The government does not want to keep the local government anymore as it wants to run the lower tier of the government with the lawmakers and own people. - Matiur Rahman Tapan, chairman of a Up, said in a roundtable
* It is not a struggle between the Mps and local representatives rather it is basically a problem of political culture. - Mahmudur Rahman Manna, Organizing Secretary of Awami League

3.8. Some core issues revealed by Prof Aminuzzaman:

* lack of widespread planning for decentralization;
* absence of wider consultation with population before devising decentralization strategies;
* lack of mobilization of favorite keep in the reform process;
* over-emphasis on deconcentration in the decentralization plans;
* bureaucratic expansion in the name of decentralization;
* bureaucratic dominance remained intact even after decentralization;
* inadequate power and authority to people's representatives;

The tendency to cry out for decentralization in social and suffocating the sincere efforts in custom is still the order of the day in Bangladesh and most other developing countries. Though the perennial bureaucratic resistance is the requisite culprit in this scam, collusive and docile political leaders cannot deny their share.

Professor Dr. Tofael Ahmed (Professor, Chittagong University) and Professor Dr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, Du in Banglapedia (www.banglapedia.org) say, decentralization scenario in Bangladesh is miniature encouraging. In their words, evolution of decentralization in Bangladesh is characterized by: (a) domination by and unblemished dependence on central/national government; (b) unrepresentative character; (c) grossly inadequate mobilization of local resources; (d) miniature or lack of participation of the rural poor in the decentralized bodies; (e) successive regimes' marginal and superficial commitment to devolution or decentralization in practice.

Prof Aminuzzaman additional said, it seems that the local government institutions act like a front society of the ruling party. They should be independent and a local government commission, not any ministry, should operate them.

It is utterly unfortunate that Upazilla level of Bangladesh local government, which has the makings of being a strong local government body, is not being put into operation only because of resistance from the elected lawmakers afraid of losing their supremacy in their respective constituencies.

3.9. Power length as an obstacle to local government:

Most importantly, and somewhat paradoxically, a culture of accountability springs from an interaction between civil society and acceptable institutions, which ordinarily have to be created by a strong central political force. However, the evidence from Bangladesh is more ambiguous on this point, suggesting that while decentralization was a requisite catalyst for associational activity, the prevailing servant-master relationships between villagers and bureaucrats and council representatives did not surely keep the production of complaints about bad behavior or lack of accountability.

4. Ways Out:

* For strengthening local government bodies, the hegemony of Mps, particularly imposed by the new Act, must be curtailed.
* To make the local government institutions more functional, we need a decentralization policy in the light of our Constitutions.
* The political governments should not enact any laws, which undermine the spirit of the Constitution, or violates any articles.
* For increasing income of the local government bodies, land replacement fees can be increased, the local government bodies can be authorized to use jetties, water bodies and khaslands (state owned lands) and enforce tax on galvanic poles, mobile phone towers and bill boards, will significantly increase the income of the local government bodies.
* Strengthening local government is the customary objective of the upazila system. Thus, agriculture, land administration, condition and family planning, customary education, rural electrification, poultry, fisheries, live stocks, horticulture, social forestry, milk production, cooperatives marketing, etc. Should be transferred to the Upazila Parishad. There should be, in fact, more devolution of power and delegation of authority to the Upazila Parishad.
* Large funds from the Adp can be given for meeting financial needs of the local government institutions, which will build their capacity and will ensure grassroots development.
* The Ups can be authorized to institute roads, culverts and bridges in their respective areas.
* Honorarium of elected chairmen and members need to be enhanced, and an environment can be created so that honest and competent population could be elected.
* The current Upazila Act should be amended immediately.
* Activation of the Up standing committees can be done through joint monitoring and supervision by both social agencies and civil society bodies.

5. Conclusion:

Experiences in other parts of the world show that the closer the authorities and resources are to the people, the greater the benefits they bring for society. In Bangladesh, local government structures remain weak, posing as a major obstacle in achieving the goal of poverty alleviation programs. Local government as a political custom to ensure development and social participation in development activities is far from being an effective tool of governance in Bangladesh. Being mostly poor and illiterate, particularly at the grassroots, the population hardly go to bureaucrats with their problems because they are afraid to approach them. As such, they approach the local social representatives, whom they think as local guardians well aware of their needs and feelings. But, no step was ever made to train them up. Elected local bodies in the menagerial units in fact ensure effective participation of the population in decisions that affect them, and this participation is a prerequisite for creating a democratic polity at all levels, which will deepen its roots. If people's voices are heard, and their opportunities of participation are upheld, democracy can be strengthened. If local government bodies are not strong and well functioning, development at the grassroots level cannot be ensured. To materialize the dream of construction a democratic Bangladesh free from poverty, construction a strong local government is a must. As such, bringing about reforms in the local government is now the query of the time. The charter of turn or vision 2021, to turn Bangladesh into a respectable nation with the transformation of political culture and production the society corruption free, will be difficult to accomplish unless a strong, honest and dedicated local level governance law emerges to keep the central government.

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